A growing body of national-level survey evidence indicates that small-scale entrepreneurial activity has been an important engine of growth in post-socialist economies. Here we use a rich regional data set to obtain a statistical characterization of the relationship between entrepreneurial activity and economic growth within post-Soviet Russia. Russia is a useful laboratory for evaluating links between entrepreneurial activity and growth because of the striking variation in initial conditions, the adoption of policy reforms, and entrepreneurial activity observed across its large number of regions in the early stages of transition. Russia has also experienced striking regional variation in subsequent growth. Conditional on variations in initial conditions and policy reform measures, we find that regional entrepreneurial activity exhibits a strong and enduring relationship with subsequent growth. JEL Codes: O4, P3, R1
Introduction
A growing body of national-level survey evidence indicates that entrepreneurial activity is a critical source of growth in post-socialist economies. Entrepreneurs operating small businesses have managed to rapidly fill niches that were ignored under socialism in industries ranging from construction, trade, commerce, small-scale manufacturing and services. In many post-socialist cities, entrepreneurs have thrived even though their plants and equipment have been poorly protected; their contracts have been poorly enforced; their taxes have been high and the regulations they face have been burdensome; they have routinely been forced to make extra-legal payments to local mafias and government organs for protection; and they have had limited sources of external finance (Frye and Shleifer, 1997; Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 2001 ).
The view that entrepreneurial activity is an important engine of growth emerges from the observation that post-socialist economies that have experienced relatively robust patterns of entrepreneurial development have tended to enjoy relatively high rates of economic growth. For example, synthesizing a large body of work focusing on the experiences of Poland, China and Russia, McMillan and Woodruff (2001) conclude that the robust economic growth enjoyed by Poland and China is attributable in large part to the substantial entrepreneurial development they have experienced, while the economic stagnation Russia has endured during its transition has as a root source its record of relatively sluggish entrepreneurial development. 1 The positive experiences of Vietnam and Hungary, contrasting with the negative experience of Ukraine, provide additional examples. Economic reforms implemented in Vietnam in 1986 led to the rapid resurgence of a virtually defunct private sector; seven years later small private firms servicing demands for clothing, footwear and manufactures such as metal-and wood-working accounted for an estimated 29% of national output (McMillan and Woodruff 1999; Ronnas and Bhargavi 2001) . Regarding Hungary, the relatively well-developed small-scale private sector that was in place prior to transition (operating primarily in manufactures, retail and trade) has also seen a substantial increase in market share during transition (Webster 1993; Kornai 2000) . In both cases, economic growth has been robust during transition. In contrast, the experience of Ukraine mirrors that of Russia: the development of its entrepreneurial sector has been limited, and it has suffered economic stagnation during transition (World Bank, 1999 ).
We complement these existing studies here by using a rich regional data set to obtain a statistical characterization of the relationship between entrepreneurial activity and economic growth within post-Soviet Russia. Despite the relatively modest development of entrepreneurial activity experienced in Russia and the economic stagnation it has endured at the aggregate level, Russia provides an excellent laboratory for econometric analysis because it contains a large number of regions that exhibited striking variation in initial conditions, the adoption of policy reforms, and entrepreneurial activity in the early stages of its transition. It has also experienced striking regional variation in subsequent growth.
The data we analyze cover 70 of Russia's 89 regions. To quantify entrepreneurial activity, we measure the number of legally registered small private enterprises in place in each region as of December 1995. These enterprises consist of small-scale start-up firms and private spin-offs from previously state-run enterprises. Growth is measured as the average annual growth in real per capita income observed between 1993:IV and 1997:IV, and between 1993:IV and 2000:IV (the former sub-period is analyzed for comparison with results we presented in Berkowitz and DeJong, 2002 , which we discuss below).
In our evaluation, we seek to account for factors that may have had a joint impact on entrepreneurial activity and growth. We also seek to control for potential problems arising from the possibility that the entrepreneurial activity we measure in part reflects optimism regarding prospects for subsequent growth. Given these concerns, we quantify a broad range of initial conditions and policy reform measures; the variables we use to do so predate our measures of entrepreneurial activity and growth. Our analysis then proceeds in three steps. First, we regress growth on the complete set of variables we have compiled. The variables that fail to enter significantly in this regression at the 20% significance level are earmarked for use as instruments for entrepreneurial activity in the second step of our analysis; the remaining variables are withheld for exclusive use as conditioning variables in subsequent growth regressions. Second, we estimate the relationship between entrepreneurial activity and growth using a two-stage least-squares procedure. In the first-stage regression, we obtain a fitted version of entrepreneurial activity using the instruments identified in step one. In the second-stage regression, we regress growth on the fitted version of entrepreneurial activity and the conditioning variables selected in step one; our conclusions regarding the relationship between entrepreneurial activity and growth are based on this second-stage regression. Third, we conclude by regressing entrepreneurial activity on the full range of additional variables we compiled. We do this to evaluate the explanatory power of the variables that were excluded as instruments for entrepreneurial activity in the second step of our analysis.
Our results indicate that regional entrepreneurial activity has had a strong and enduring relationship with growth. Specifically, our estimates indicate that a onestandard-deviation increase in regional entrepreneurial activity (reflecting an additional Previous work of ours (Berkowitz and DeJong, 2002) focused on the relationship between the regional implementation of policy reforms and subsequent economic growth within Russia. Measuring growth over a subset of the regions considered here (48 rather than 70) and over a shorter time horizon (1993 ( :IV -1997 :IV), we found a general pattern of indirect links between the implementation of policy reforms and growth, with entrepreneurial activity serving as a critical conduit. This finding prompted the more comprehensive analysis of the relationship between regional patterns of entrepreneurial activity and economic growth presented here. The broader range of regions we are now able to study, and the longer time period over which we can measure growth, leaves us better equipped to characterize this relationship while controlling for potential problems arising from simultaneity. We proceed in the next section with a description of our data set; we then describe our estimation procedure and present our results in Section 3, and conclude in Section 4.
Data Summary
Our data set contains regional measures of real income growth, entrepreneurial activity, initial conditions, and initial policy reform measures. By "initial", we mean measurements taken as close to the beginning of Russia's transition period as possible.
Most variables are measured as of 1993; none are measured later than 1994. Our purpose in compiling initial measurements is to use them either as instruments for our measure of entrepreneurial activity, or as conditioning variables in growth regressions, thus the importance of obtaining measurements early in the transition process.
The data set covers 70 of Russia's 89 regions. Most of the excluded regions are now-autonomous Oblasts, Okrugs and Krais that were part of then-conglomerate regions early in Russia's transition process, and thus for whom separate measurements of "initial" variables are unavailable. The war-torn Chechen Republic is also excluded for lack of data. The 70 regions covered in our data set represent all eleven of Russia's geographic territories.
2a. Growth and Entrepreneurship
We measure economic growth by computing the real purchasing power of income per capita at three dates (1993:IV, 1997:IV, and 2000:IV), and then computing the average annual growth rate observed between 1993:IV and 1997:IV, and between 1993:IV and 2000:IV (source: unpublished Goskomstat data). We denote these measures as GROWTH.
To measure entrepreneurial activity (denoted as ENT), we use the regional registry of small private enterprises per thousand inhabitants as of December 31, 1995 (source: Goskomstat Rossii, 1996 . These enterprises are comprised primarily of legally registered start-ups and small spin-offs from former state-owned enterprises that first began to emerge in the Former Soviet Union during the perestroika reforms in the late 1980s (Aslund, 1997) . This measure provides an accurate characterization of overall regional entrepreneurial activity, since as noted in the introduction, the bulk of legal entrepreneurial activity in Russia has been concentrated in small start-ups and spin-offs.
Ideally, we would work with an earlier measure of this activity to reduce potential problems associated with simultaneity, but accurate and consistent measures do not exist prior to this date (Aslund, 1997) . This lack of prior data availability serves as the primary motivation for the 2SLS estimation procedure we employ in Section 3.
As Table 1 indicates, Russia has experienced substantial variation in economic growth and entrepreneurial activity. Through 1997, the average annual regional growth rate was 1.46%, and the standard deviation of was 4.75 percentage points. Average growth through 2000 fell to -7.31%, with a standard deviation of 3.25 percentage points.
One reason for this striking drop is the financial crisis Russia suffered in August of 1998.
Regarding ENT, it ranges from a low of 1.71 (enterprises per thousand inhabitants) in the Kursk Oblast to 16.61 in Moscow; its average is 4.19, and its standard deviation is 2.29.
2b. Initial Conditions
We control for six initial conditions that summarize regional population, industrial and locational characteristics. Regarding population characteristics, one variable we consider is the share of the population fifteen years old and higher as of 1994 that completed high school and received at least some post-secondary training (EDU).
This variable was collected in the 1994 Russian household micro-census (Goskomstat, 1995) . Second, we consider the initial reformist orientation of the population (REF), which is measured as the share of the population that voted for pro-reformist candidates in the December 1993 parliamentary elections (source: Clem and Craumer, 1993) . Third, we measure regional initial standards of living (INITIAL) by computing the average ratio of money income per capita to the cost of a uniform basket of 25 food goods during 1993:IV (source: unpublished Goskomstat data). Because there are striking price differentials for similar goods within Russia, it is important to convert initial per capita incomes to a purchasing-power measure that is comparable across regions. The purchasing power of per capita money income in terms of food is an attractive measure because food purchases accounted for more than half of household expenditures in the 1990s (Goskomstat 2000, p.167), and we have a uniform measure of a food basket that covers all of Russia's regions; 1993:IV marks the earliest date for which comprehensive food-basket prices and household money-income data are available.
We use two variables to quantify initial regional industrial characteristics. The first is a measure of initial production potential (IO); the second is a measure of the regional importance of the defense industry (DEFENSE). To compute IO for a given region, we multiplied the industry's labor share (source: Gaddy, 1996) by its value added, net of labor costs (this is the intermediate shadow-profit rate based on world-market prices and computed by Senik-Leygonie and Hughes, 1992); we then summed the resulting products. This measure is limited to industries that produce tradable goods, and is meant to quantify the competitiveness of a region's industrial structure on world markets prior to transition. The oil and gas industries have the highest value added, while food processing has the lowest (in fact, negative) value added. DEFENSE is measured in each region as the number of workers employed in the defense industry per thousand employed workers in 1985 (source: Gaddy, 1996) . As emphasized by Gaddy (1996) , DEFENSE is a potentially important conditioning variable since the defense industry served as a significant attractor of skilled workers, and gave regional elites close connections to powerful defense industries it Moscow. Moreover, the defense industry continues to be an important and relatively stable sector in Russia's otherwise chaotic industrial environment.
Finally, in order to take into account the potential impact of location, we measure the log of a region's transport distance from Moscow (LNDIST). Moscow was the major source of commercial, political, transport, cultural, educational, and financial activity in the Former Soviet Union, and still continues to command this important status within Russia. Thus, transport distance is a potentially useful measure of a particular region's access or lack thereof to critical activity within Russia.
As Table 1 indicates, we generally observe substantial regional variation in these measures of initial conditions. For example, the voting shares quantified under REF range from 13% (Dagestan) to 61% (St. Petersburg), with a mean of 33.3% and standard deviation of 10.16%. EDU is somewhat exceptional in this regard: it is relatively tightly dispersed, with a mean of 13.73% and a standard deviation of only 3.69%.
Initial Policy Implementation
We use two variables to quantify regional variations in the implementation of policy reforms early in Russia's economic transition: the extent of small-and large-scale privatization. As background, the transition began in January 1992 with the implementation of rapid price, trade and financial-market liberalization initiatives.
Privatization began in 1993, when the government allocated all state-owned enterprises to the property funds operated by the federal government, and the governments located in Russia's 89 regions (including the primary regional governments, and the subordinate local governments in cities, city districts, settlements, etc.). Local governments typically gained control over small shops and enterprises that operated in trade and retail markets, and sold off these enterprises for cash in the small-scale privatization program. The federal government obtained control over the larger state enterprises in sectors such as manufacturing, heavy industry, energy and communications. The federal government was then instructed to work with relevant regional governments to form a plan consistent with the dictates of the large-scale privatization program. In a successful large-scale privatization, the federal government and associated regional governments sold off ownership shares to insiders at a discount, and then allowed groups of outside investors to purchase equity in the enterprise using vouchers. The vouchers were equity claims that that Russian federal government had issued to its entire population before proceeding with the privatization.
We measure small-and large-scale privatization (SPRIV and LPRIV) using the number of enterprises privatized by local and federal governments in 1993 per thousand inhabitants in each region (source: Goskomstat, 1994). These measures exhibit substantial regional variation. For example, while the secessionist Republics of Bashkortostan, Sakha and Tatarstan had no large privatizations in 1993, Magadan, Tyumen, Ivanovo and Pskov Oblasts rapidly privatized their large state enterprises. As reported in Table 1 , the (mean, standard deviation) of SPRIV is (0.20, 0.12), and for LPRIV is (0.05, 0.04).
From a theoretical perspective, the prospective empirical relationship between privatization, entrepreneurial activity and economic growth is unclear. In their influential book on Russia's reform, Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1995) argue that an immediate and massive privatization of state-owned enterprises would provide an incentive to local and regional governments to support market reforms because they would receive revenues from sales. Moreover, rapid privatization of large enterprises would make reform irreversible because politicians would not be able to use these enterprises to promote their political objectives. Thus rapid privatization would be good for entrepreneurship because politicians would no longer have an incentive to harass new small businesses in an effort to protect state enterprises. However, Kornai (1990 Kornai ( , 2000 and Black, Kraakman and Tarassova (2000) argue that the discounted ownership positions and privileged access made available to insiders in Russia (workers and mangers in enterprises undergoing privatization) encouraged politicians and insiders to collude in an effort to gain privatization rents. A potential manifestation of this collusion is that local politicians would have an incentive to harass small-scale entrepreneurs competing with the large privatized enterprises. Boycko et al. (1995) also argue that the efficiency gains from privatization would enhance growth, while Kornai (1990 Kornai ( , 2000 and Black et al. (2000) argue that insider privatization creates a corrupt environment that potentially inhibits growth.
Results
As noted, our analysis of the relationship between small private enterprise formation and growth is based on two measures of regional growth: that observed between 1993:IV and 1997:IV; and that observed between 1993:IV and 200:IV. In part, we consider the former measure to illustrate how our 70-region analysis compares with our previous 48-region analysis (Berkowitz and DeJong, 2002) . Also, we are interested in learning whether the relationship between small private enterprise formation and growth has changed appreciably over time.
In examining this relationship, there is clearly a need to guard against problems arising from potential simultaneity. Thus our analysis is based on a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation procedure in which we use as instruments for small private enterprise formation a subset of the variables introduced above that quantify regional differences in initial conditions and reform policies. Although each variable seems to qualify as a valid instrument a priori, we only use a subset of the variables as instruments in the analysis presented below to guard against the possibility of over-fitting small private enterprise formation in our first-stage regression. Of course, the use of only a subset of available instruments entails a certain loss of efficiency. As we note below, results obtained using the full set of instruments indicate a somewhat stronger link between small private enterprise formation and growth than do the results we report in full here; footnote 3 provides details.
We begin by selecting the instruments to be used for small private enterprise formation. This is done by regressing growth measured through 1997:IV on each of the additional variables included in our data set. To be conservative, variables whose coefficients are statistically insignificant at the 20% level in this regression are selected as instruments in our two-stage procedure. OLS estimates of this regression are reported in to the list of explanatory variables in the second-stage regression, one at a time, and reestimated the model. In no case did the included instrument turn out to be statistically significant at the 20% level in the re-estimated growth regression, thus the exclusion restrictions seem valid empirically.
As Table 3 indicates, each variable included in the second-stage growth regression is statistically significant at the 5% level, and is quantitatively significant as well. Notably, a one-standard-deviation increase in small private enterprise formation corresponds with 1.52 percentage point increase in annual growth. While non-trivial, this figure is substantially lower than the estimate of 2.19 obtained in the 48-region analysis of Berkowitz and DeJong (2002) . However, this difference is due in large part to our use in this analysis of a relatively limited set of instruments, a point we return to in footnote 3 below. The quantitative significance of the remaining variables ranges from 0.824
Next, we apply our 2SLS analysis to growth measured through 2000:IV; these results are reported in Table 4 . (The first-stage regression is precisely that reported in Table 3 , and is not replicated in Table 4 .). Two versions of the second-stage growth regression are reported in this case. Version 1 was obtained using the same set of exclusion restrictions employed in Table 3 . However, in this case when we sequentially augmented this regression to include each of the excluded instruments (again, one at a time), the coefficients on LPRIV and SPRIV each turned out to be significant at the 20% level individually. Thus we also report in Table 4 a second version of the model that includes these additional variables as regressors.
Comparison of the estimates obtained using Version 1 of the model with their counterparts reported in Table 2 A clear picture that emerges from this analysis is that the regional pattern of small private enterprise formation that had been established in Russia by the mid-1990s has had a substantial and enduring relationship with subsequent economic growth. It is therefore of considerable interest to understand how regional variations in the adoption of policy reforms may have influenced small private enterprise formation. Since our measures of policy reforms were compiled very early in Russia's transition, we can offer only a limited but revealing characterization of this influence here.
As noted, we conducted the preceding 2SLS analysis using a limited subset of instruments in order to avoid over-fitting small private enterprise formation in the first stage. In Table 5 , we present an OLS regression of small private enterprise formation on the entire set of initial and policy variables in order to provide a better characterization of the importance of these variables. Comparing the first-stage estimates reported in Table 3 with the estimates in Table 5, In sum, it appears that regions with relatively well-educated citizens sympathetic to the adoption of economic reforms have enjoyed relatively high levels of small private enterprise formation, which has exhibited a strong and lasting relationship with economic growth. We have found little direct evidence here that privatization activity has had substantive economic effects, but since our measures of these activities were compiled in an early stage of the transition process, caution should be taken in basing general conclusions on this finding (see Berkowitz and Holland, 2001 , for a broader exploration of the impact of privatization activity on small enterprises).
Conclusion
Exploiting the rich regional variation in entrepreneurial activity and initial conditions that existed within Russia early in its transition, in addition to the regional variation in subsequent growth it has realized, we have found a strong and enduring relationship between entrepreneurial activity and growth. This intra-national evidence thus complements evidence of the importance of entrepreneurial activity for growth that has emerged from international comparisons of transitional economies. The fact that we 3 Use of the fitted version of small private enterprise formation obtained in this unrestricted regression in the second-stage growth regressions reported in Tables 2 and 3 yields systematically higher estimates of the quantitative significance of small private enterprise formation. In Table 3 , the estimate of 1.522 increases to 1.91 (thus comparing closely to the estimate of 2.19 obtained by Berkowitz and DeJong, 2002) ; in Table 4 , the Version 1 estimate of 1.03 increases to 1.275; and the Version 2 estimate of 1.074 increases to 1.334. Note: Standard errors are heteroskedasticity consistent (White, 1980) . "Quantitative Significance" indicates the estimated impact of a one-standard-deviation increase in the indicated independent variable on the dependent variable. The χ 2 (4) test of the joint insignificance of the coefficients on Education, Distance, and Large-and Small-Scale Privatization yields a test statistic of 2.395, which has a p value of 0.664. Note: The regression model used to obtain fitted values of small private enterprise formation is that reported in Table 2 . 
